ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Globalization is a multi-facetted phenomenon whose dynamics and impact on the economy and particularly on the society are still not fully understood. Globalization exerts effects not only on the economy and the environment, but also on cultures, social and political systems, and human well-being. Although the debate has focused on mostly economic effects such as unemployment, growth and income inequality, the impact of globalization on values and cultural attitudes are very important with broader economic and social consequences. In our contribution, we draw a distinction between economic integration into world markets of goods and informational integration into world 'markets' of information flows.
This chapter aims to make a contribution to our understanding of the social effects of globalization through the values channel. People's values are shaped by a number of factors including customs, traditions and the importance one attaches to religion. First, the chapter aims to investigate how globalization affects women's religious conservative values (religious belief and religiosity) and socio-political conservative attitudes. We then investigate how conservative values affect female employment. This way, we aim to contribute to the existing literature by extending the discussion on religion/values-female employment nexus to the role of globalization as a transmission mechanism. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions in the empirical analysis: In general, it appears that those societal changes globalization triggers nowadays in the MENA countries resemble the changes that Western Europe underwent during the Cold War period prior to1995. In light of this finding, the developments in Western Europe observed from 1995 on might predict future societal changes in the MENA countries for the years to come. It becomes also apparent that Eastern Europe, shaped by Communism and a regaining OrthodoxChristianism, is very much distinct from Western Europe and the MENA region likewise.
Specifically, economic globalization that takes place in the MENA region tends to foster adherence to conservative-religious values, and socio-political conservative values in general.
Only conservative values directly pertaining to labor market participation (e.g., girl's education and importance of family) are weakened as MENA countries economically globalize, possibly reflecting an adjustment of women's values to the transforming forces of economic integration and the new economic necessities that arise in the region. While a similar development of weakening of these secular conservative values alone is also observable for Western Europe prior to 1995, from 1995 on it appears that economic globalization had been destructive also to all remaining tested facets of women's secular conservatism in Western Europe. Overall, the destruction of conservative and traditional values appears contagious.
Globalization of information through media and the internet tends to make people more critical toward religion-based and secular conservative values -this is observable in both regions and all time periods under investigation likewise. In contrast, in the MENA countries, cross-cultural personal contacts e.g. through tourism and seasonal work appear to foster adherence to religious values.
Finally, regarding female employment, religious values and socio-political conservative values appear to decrease the probability of female employment, for all three regions investigated. In this respect, women in the MENA region are similar to women in Western and Eastern Europe.
Also active membership in religious groups and a high frequency of service attendanceexpressing adhering to religious values in a formal way -reduces labor market participation. The restrictive influence of conservative-secular and conservative-religious values on female employment is found to be stable over the last 30 years.
The findings of this study bear an important implication for socio-economic policy making in the MENA region. Economic globalization appears to trigger an automatism and dynamics that ultimately leads to increased women's labor market participation: the forces of global economic integration trigger a change in women's conservative values that bear a direct relation to their labor market decision and, this way, they tend to positively affect female labor market participation. Information available through the internet and media appears to add to this effect.
Obviously, non-conservative politicians wishing a stronger integration of women in their domestic labor markets simply need to open up their economy and society towards outside flows of goods and information. Conservative values (divorce, abortion) ( Tables 7, 8, 9) ---13
Active membership (Table 6) x --12
Note: + and -denote positive (increasing) and negative (decreasing) impacts, respectively. x denotes no significant impact.
The structure of this contribution is as follows. Following this introduction, section 2 describes our novel hypotheses and describes empirical literature on the values/female labor force participation interaction. Section 3 provides definitions of globalization and female conservatism and presents the data. This is followed by the empirical analysis for the MENA region and Europe (Section 4). The last section 5 discusses the findings and concludes the chapter. Table O provides a non-numerical overview of our findings in Tables 1 through 14 .
BACKGROUND: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

2.1.How does globalization affect values?
Human behavior, as classical economic theory assumes, is determined by two distinct features:
individual's 'preferences' and the 'restrictions' she faces. Preferences are commonly called attitudes and values by non-economists: for example, a conservative political attitude might imply preferring economic growth over income redistribution, or, for conservatively-minded women, preferring caring for family members over earning income in the labor market. Typical restrictions individuals face include one's household budget (income/wage), but also other restrictions imposed by society such as governmental institutions and social norms.
Globalization -the growing cross-country interaction and integration of people, companies, and governments -is a process that started in the 16th century with the development of fast cargo ships, lowering the costs of overseas transportation so that frequent and long-distance trade with daily goods such as food and cloths became affordable. Long-distance exchange of goods was also accompanied by the exchange of information. In this article, we postulate that the process of globalization challenges one's own political views and values and might lead to their revision (Fischer, 2012; 2015) . Through these changes in values and attitudes, globalization may ultimately affect people's behavior in the economic and social sphere. Globalization might alter one's values and attitudes through differing channels:
first, through the global exchange of information, and, second, more indirectly through global trade.
Our first hypothesis is that global information is used for up-dating priors -new information leads possibly to a revision of ones' beliefs and social or political attitudes. More precisely, we conjecture that the global exchange of information leads to an updating and a revision of one's own beliefs: be it through mass media, the internet or through personal contacts during travel, informational globalization always involves getting information on foreign governance structures, different ways of organizing the local economy, foreign culture, differing historical experiences (Fischer, 2012) . For example, in Egypt, growing knowledge about democratic governance structure in Europe might have led to a revision by young Egyptians of how they evaluate their own political system. In the specific case of conservatism, gaining knowledge about liberal societies in other parts of the world and the challenges these societies might impose on young people might lead to a revision of one's own political and social views, making one either more paternalistic-conservative or more liberal.
Our second hypothesis uses the idea that endogenous and continuously changing preferences are affected also by changes in the socio-economic environment in which they emerge. More specifically, international trade and foreign investment transform the local economy by generating disproportional sectoral growth, creating new industries of international specialization and economic opportunities. We postulate that this (changing) economic environment influences people's views and attitudes: Economic globalization alters people's values and attitudes through its effect on the domestic economy, to which their preferences finally (need to) adapt.
We conjecture that women' social and political attitudes can, in principle, react in two opposite ways: they might evolve either in opposition to these economic changes or in a way that supports them. Expressed differently, globalization might make women's preferences more 'labor-marketfriendly' supporting the underlying economic transformation -or, on the opposite, globalization might make women's preferences more conservative, more religious, more 'family-oriented', opposing the changes in the domestic economy. Our empirical analysis aims to investigate which of these two possible reactions of preferences to economic globalization prevails in the MENA region and Europe.
How do values shape female labor force participation?
Women's values shape their economic decisions through their identity, a person's sense of self. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , in their pioneering work on the identity economics approach, argue that the choice of identity by individuals may be the most important economic decision because identity is central to behavior, and limits imposed on this choice may directly affect one's economic wellbeing. 1 From a gender point of view, it is argued that women will have lower labor force attachment than men if their identity is enhanced by work at home. Accordingly, women's movement is said to increase female labor force participation by reshaping societal notions of femininity and the link between gender and tasks, hence redefining women's identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000) . Based on this theoretical framework, we argue that globalization is expected to influence female labor force attachment by reshaping women's identity and the importance they attach to it.
It is important to understand the factors that affect identity as it directly influences behavior, it.
Two key factors are cultural tradition and religion (Turner & Reynolds, 2010 ; cited by (Hayo & Caris, 2013) . Both cultural tradition and religion bear direct gendered labor market implications by influencing men's and women's perception about gender division of labor at home and in the labor market. In a formal game-theoretic framework, Hayo and Caris (2013) show for women who socialized in a traditional family environment that working in the labor market leads to a greater loss in their female identity, negatively affecting their labor market participation.
The impact of religion as a key determinant of identity and thus of gender equality and women's socioeconomic status has long been the subject of literature especially in sociology. Religion affects women's labor force participation because different religions have different life styles and different attitude toward gender roles and fertility behavior (Lehrer, 1995) . In all religions,
conservative groups believe that women should focus on building a virtuous home and upbringing their children while men should take on the role of main breadwinner and final decision-making authority (Hawley, 1994 ; cited by Glass, 2006) . However, some scholars argue that conservative religious groups are expected to have little effect on women's behavioral choices due to the diverse thinking and tolerance in these groups as well as strong economic incentives and constraints being faced (Glass & Nath, 2006) . There is also evidence that traditional attitudes of women are shaped in their youth and negatively influence women's human capital investment and their labor supply (Vella, 1994) .
Particularly the role of Islam in explaining the status of women in the MENA region has been an old debate. While some scholars attribute this outcome to Islam itself, others argue that it is not
Islam itself but high levels of personal religiosity common in Islamic societies that leads to less gender egalitarian societies in the MENA region (Price, 2011) . Going beyond Islam, no one religion stands out as consistently more gender inequitable than others, and higher religiosity, the intensity of belief, itself is associated with less egalitarian gender ideology after controlling for a country's religion and individual religious affiliation in all religions (Seguino, 2011) . Moreover, there appears to be reversed causality in the relation between culture/attitudes and female labor force participation; however, the latter affects the former with a lag (Seguino, 2007) .
National modernization policies have also had an influence on the status of women in the MENA region; specifically, the introduction of state-led modernization programs financed to a great extent with oil export wealth impacted the whole society in MENA countries. This process of modernization together with pressing political and economic realities made women's social mobility less limited (Haghighat, 2012) . Modernization theory and development economics claim that transition from preindustrial agricultural economy to an early industrial urban economy and later to a post-industrial economy has a U-shaped effect on female labor force participation: With the transition to an urban, industrial economy, women's participation in the labor market declines with the physical separation of work and home life, which were taking place together in the agricultural economy. In the latter stage of post-industrialization, with increased education and reduced fertility together with more job opportunities, women's domestic responsibilities at home become less demanding and their participation in the labor market increases (Haghighat, 2012 (Elson, 1995) . Sociological studies put relatively more emphasis on the effect of gender attitudes and identity on female labor market attachment. This section presents an overview of major findings with a particular attention to the role of values and religion in understanding female labor force participation in MENA countries.
In developing countries economic integration led to a feminization of labor force through the expansion of labor-intensive production and flexible forms of employment (Standing, 1989; Standing, 1999) . This demand-driven process of feminization in the labor market is observable for the manufacturing industries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Syria, and Yemen, driven by private foreign ownership, exporting activities, and gender equality politics (Fakih & Ghazalian, 2015 ) (see Fischer, 2015 , for a literature overview on employment effects in MENA countries). However, this process has been weak in the MENA region with an average female labor force participation rate of 25%, well below the worldwide average of 50%. This regional disparity is especially puzzling when one considers that the MENA region recorded the fastest growth in Human Development Index since the 1970s, achieving gender parity in secondary school enrolment rates and even higher enrollment rates for girls at universities (World Bank, 2013) . One possible explanation is that male laborers set free in the contracting sector enter the (formerly female labor-intensive) exporting sector, decreasing female employment in this expanding sector of the economy (Fischer, 2015) . Another explanation is the shrinking public sector serving as traditional female-worker employer that increased the importance of private sector for women in the MENA region. Restrictions on mobility impact the choice of women, as do legal restrictions on women's work and political participation, the skill mismatch that is more severely faced by women than by men, as does employer discrimination against women as well as women's own concerns about their reputation and safety (World Bank, 2013 Intensity of belief reduces the likelihood of employment while participation in religious activities increases it after controlling for individual and household characteristics. However, when country fixed-effects are introduced, these factors become insignificant highlighting the importance of country-specific institutional, economic and socio-political context. Moreover, the impact of religion on female labor force participation can be different across rural and urban areas. For example, in Malaysia, religion affects women's labor market attachment only in rural areas (Amin & Alam, 2008) . In Turkey, it is documented that higher urbanization leads to higher conservatism which negatively affects female labor force participation (Goksel, 2013 ).
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Having a conservative-traditional attitude towards working women is shown to have a negative effect on female labor market participation in the case of Jordan's capital Amman (Chamlou, Muzi, & Ahmed, 2011) . It is often not clear whether it is a particular religious faith itself or the historically dominant cultural environment that lies below these social norms limiting women's entry into labor market. Analyzing the relative importance of these two aspects of identity, Hayo and Caris (2013) find that Muslim women have a lower probability of working across all countries while they have a higher probability of working compared to Arab women with nonMuslim religions. This finding is attributed to the more significant role of traditional cultural norms than religion itself in the MENA region. It is also documented that being a religious individual has a more detrimental effect on attitudes towards working women than living in a highly religious society (Price, 2011) .
In OECD countries, the increase in female educational attainment, the expansion of service sector jobs and part-time employment, and the availability of childcare services are the three major factors that explain the rise in female labor force participation (Thévenon, 2013) . Regarding the impact of economic and informational globalization across OECD countries, economic integration is found to increase the probability of women's employment at the national level, while the information dimension of globalization appears to change female labor force participation choices rather at the regional level (Fischer, 2015) . In the case of European countries, labor market institutions and family-oriented policies caught significant attention as important factors in understanding the trends in female labor force participation. In a study covering 15 EU countries over the last 20 years, it is found that both labor market reforms towards a flexicure system and expansion of family-oriented policies explain the rise in female labor force participation particularly among young and highly educated women. The same study also finds that deregulatory labor market policies are effective in increasing women's employment only when supportive social policies are introduced (Cipollone, Patacchini, & Vallanti, 2014) . The positive role of public childcare services on women's employment is also documented in a study covering 24 EU countries including the new member states in Eastern
Europe (Erhel & Guergoat-Larivière, 2013 ).
Culture and particularly attitudes towards a woman's role in the family are reported as statistically and economically significant factors affecting women's employment for a panel of OECD countries, even after controlling for the role of policies, institutions and structural country characteristics (Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, & Serafinelli, 2013) . Analyzing the specific role of religion for a cross-country analysis of 47 European countries, Pastore & Tenaglia (2013) find that belonging to the Orthodox, Catholic and, even more, Muslim denominations reduce the likelihood of employment for women while being a Protestant increases it. Interestingly, they find no difference between religiously active and non-active women for Orthodox and Muslim denominations while active women with Catholic or Protestant denominations tend to work less.
To the contrary, in the case of Germany, religious denomination is found to have a weak effect while women's regular participation in religious activities is found to have significant negative effect on women's labor force participation (Heineck, 2004) . The negative effect of the strength of belief on women's employment is also documented for Sweden (Maneschiold & Haraldsson, 2007) . These findings support the hypothesis that degree the degree of religiosity but not religion itself is important in influencing women's labor market attachment.
DATA AND DEFINITIONS
This article In the following we define and describe briefly the key notions and concepts used in the empirical analysis. In particular, we provide a) definitions of the MENA and Europe regions, b)
definitions of economic and information globalization, c) a definition of 'traditional values', that is socio-political conservatism, including religiosity.
Definition of MENA region and Europe
There exist various definitions of the regions 'MENA' and 'Europe' -a cultural one, a political one, a geographic one, and a geo-strategic one, among others. In this chapter, the geographic definition is employed which defines 'Europe' as lying on the European continent, and 'MENA' as lying in the Northern African belt and Middle-East. I regard Turkey as lying in both regions, In the course of analysis, we will not only observe whether there are differences between MENA countries and European countries with respect to globalization effects. It is also important to draw a distinction between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because of their structural and historical differences. The geographic distinction between 'East' and 'West' will be drawn along the old Austrian-Hungarian empire and the German empire; all countries lying east to these empires are considered 'Eastern Europe'. The WVS includes Western European countries from its very start around 1981, but Eastern Europe and the MENA countries are covered only from the 1990s on. It was in 1990 that German unification took place, but it was in 1994 that the last Russian soldier left German ground, and it was in 1993 that the Czech Republic split up into two separate states, and it was in 1991 when Yugoslavia broke up into individual states. For this reason, the year 1994-1995 is chosen as the first year of the post-cold war world order.
Definitions of globalization
This chapter uses three definitions and measures of globalization: first, economic globalization through trade, second, globalization through international personal contacts, and third, information globalization through media and the internet. Eastern Europe and 83 points measured for Western Europe. In our empirical analysis, we employ the two subcomponents (each ranging from 0 to 100) of 'information through the virtual space' and 'information through personal contacts' separately. The first relates to information gained through travel, migration and tourism, while the second relates to information gained through media (TV, Newspapers) and the internet. Table A1 of the Appendix provides some descriptive statistics. questions that are available for a sufficient number of survey waves and countries so that at the macro level a panel structure emerges. The single measures of conservatism used in this study will be presented in more detail during the course of empirical analysis.
Definition of conservative-religious values
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Correlation Analysis: MENA countries
In any empirical analysis, it is important to look at simple relationships prior to applying more sophisticated statistical methods. We first present some exemplary correlations between globalization and religious values. The scatter plots show that intensifying integration into world markets is correlated with a higher degree of religiosity in the female population in the MENA countries, as is the better international connectedness through the internet and media (see Figures 1 and 2 ). In contrast, cross-country personal contacts through tourism and travel appear to be very weakly related with the importance of religion (not shown). The respective correlation coefficients are 0.64, 0.24 and 0.10 for each globalization measure. Particularly economic globalization and the degree of religiosity show a strong correlation. Although no causal relation can be drawn from this analysis, globalization seems to be positively related to the degree of religiosity in those
countries.
An alternative dimension of religiosity is defined as one's confidence in religious organizations and churches, measured on a 4-category scale, ranging from 'not at all' to 'a great deal'. Figure 3 presents the scatter plot for this measure of religiosity and informational globalization for 14
MENA countries and 27 country-year observations. There is a clearly negative correlation of informational globalization with people's confidence in religious organizations; the correlation coefficient is -0.29 (-0.06 for economic globalization and 0.02 for international personal contacts). 
Econometric Analysis
Globalization and women's religious values in MENA and European countries
As next step we present results of a multivariate analysis of globalization and religiosity for women in the MENA region and Europe. We employ measures of religiosity and belief in religious values, particularly the belief in god, the importance of religion, self-reported religiosity, and service attendance. For this model and those to come, the regression model can be written in mathematical form as follows. Pseudo R2 0.113 0.077 0.132 0.067 Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), a dichotomous index of Muslim denomination, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 1 presents the regression results for the impact of economic globalization and globalization of information on four measures of religiosity and adherence to religious values of women in the MENA countries. We observe that the different dimensions of globalization exert differential (non-homogenous) effects: Economic globalization -a country's integration into global markets -increases women's likelihood of adherence to religious values and religiosity: the more a MENA country opens up to international trade, the higher the probability for its female residents to find religion or god important in their lives, the more likely that they regard themselves as religious persons, and the more likely that they attend service in mosques or churches. 4 The estimation results for international personal contacts through travel and work and information globalization through the internet and media are mixed and difficult to interpret. Our reading is that international personal contacts and work experience foster religious beliefs (self-report importance of god, service attendance) while media and global communication rather weaken them (importance of religion or god in life). Overall these findings of Table 1 can be interpreted as follows. Economic globalization transforms the economy and society so violently that people seek guidance and support from their religious leaders and value systems. Similarly, personal contacts with people from alien cultures let women from MENA countries find and re-enforce their local cultural identity in religious (club) activities like attending service. On the other hand, critical information through the global media put one's own value system into question -letting women from MENA countries raise critical questions about their religious values and institutions.
For European countries, the estimation results of the same analysis are presented in Table 2 .
Because of the different histories between Eastern and Western Europe (post-communist, longtime isolated countries versus traditional democratic and open OECD countries), the country sample is split into two groups 'Eastern Europe' and 'Western Europe', defined by geographic location.
It appears that in Western Europe globalization has no impact on religious values whatsoever, with two exceptions: first, service attendance, which declines in cross-national media communication, and second, the importance of god, which increases in economic integration. For Eastern Europe, with a weak statistical significance at the 10 percent level, economic globalization appears to increase female residents' religious values and beliefs -this is a parallel development to that observed in the MENA region (see Table 1 ). In both Western and Eastern Europe, modern communication and information exchange has the tendency of lowering women's adherence to religious values and participation in religious activities (the coefficient signs are all negative throughout). However, in contrast to the MENA region, there is neither a fostering nor a lowering effect of information globalization through personal contacts, travel and work.
One may argue that in Western Europe the vast changes in countries' openness occurred prior to 1994, that is during the post-WW II period, while little changes in globalization are observable from the 1990s on. Indeed, e.g. France experienced from 1980 to 1995 an increase in economic openness by 30% (48 points to 63 points) , while there were little changes between 1995 and 2010 (69 points) (see also the discussion in Fischer & Somogyi, 2012 In tendency, the importance of religious values declines in economic openness, while the attendance-of-service decreasing effect of both economic and informational globalization appears particularly strong. 
Globalization and organizations of religion
Religious values can be followed and religiosity can be lived in private space and in institutional space such as mosques and churches equally. Hence the question arises whether or not the development we have observed for religious values and religiosity are similar for the institutions and organizations that claim to teach and safeguard those values. Specifically, we look at two measures: first, people's reported confidence in religious organizations, and second, their membership in such organizations. Confidence in religious organizations is measured on a 4-point scale, based on the question 'how much confidence do you have in them?' 5 Table 4 reports the empirical results for confidence in religion and Table 5 for membership in religious organizations. The most striking finding is that exposure to international flows of information through the internet and media make people more critical toward churches and other religious organizations.
Table 4. Globalization and confidence in religious organizations
This development is observable in both the MENA region, and Eastern and Western Europe. In Western Europe, this influence of informational globalization is stronger during the Cold War period. Only observable in the MENA region, cross-national personal contacts increase people's confidence in their religious institutions and organizations.
In contrast, international trade exerts the opposite effect: it raises people's confidence in religious organizations -this is observable both in the MENA region, and in Western Europe prior to 1995 (columns 1 and 5). For the remaining regions and time periods, economic globalization shows no effect. Obviously, with respect to economic globalization and informational globalization, the development of the MENA region since the 90ies is somewhat in parallel to the development in Western Europe prior to 1995, as a comparison of columns 1 and 5 of Table 4 reveals.
Another facet of religious organizations is membership in them. The WVS provides information on 'membership' in religious organizations; membership includes both active and passive memberships. In Europe, there is a financial incentive to cease the official membership in religious organizations for tax saving reasons. On the other hand, in Europe, churches run hospitals and kindergartens and other social enterprises, co-financed by the government. Table 5 reports the results for the impact of globalization on the probability of being a member in religious organizations. In the MENA region, we do not observe any changes triggered by economic or informational globalization. In Europe, membership probability increases with international trade but decreases with greater exposure to the worldwide flow of information -a finding mostly driven by the pre-1995 era in Western Europe. We can differentiate between active and passive membership for only some waves of the WVS.
Table 5. Globalization and membership in religious organizations
(1)(2)
Table 6. Globalization and active and inactive memberships in religious organizations
These few observations permit only an analysis for the MENA region and Europe; most of the observations are from either the mid-nineties (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) and from 2000 or later. Table 6 presents multinomial logit estimation results in which non-membership serves as the reference outcome or base category. 
Globalization and secular conservative values
Historically, religious values gave rise to political and social conservatism restricting women's access to the labor market, while 'progressive' political parties rejected religious institutions and the role they played in preserving the traditional role model. Nowadays, however, this clear distinction between conservative-religious and progressive-atheist attitudes has been blurred: e.g., today it is not uncommon to be religious and to share progressive views at the same time.
Therefore it is necessary to analyze conservative secular values separately from religious values when discussing the societal effects of economic and informational globalization. Conservative socio-political values and attitudes are defined as adherence to the patriarchic family structure, which supports the traditional role model, assigning women the role of household worker and childcare giver and men the role of household head and breadwinner; this view affects fertility decisions, the distribution of resources among family members and the desirability of the state of marriage for a woman.
To measure women's social and political conservatism, the following survey questions of the WVS are employed: The question about the importance of family in respondent's life, measured in 4 categories from (1) "not important at all" to (4) "very important"; the question on whether university education should be more for boys than for girls, and the question on whether men are better political leaders than women, with answers to both questions measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from (1) "strongly disagree" to (4) "agree strongly". We also employ three questions on whether the respondents believe that certain actions are justifiable: divorce, abortion, or suicide.
The survey question 'please tell me whether the following action can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between:…' allows answers on a 10-point scale, with (after recoding) the highest value given to the most conservative attitude, that is viewing divorce, abortion, etc. as never justifiable. The empirical analysis applies regression model (1) accordingly.
In line with this traditional-conservative attitude is possibly that family is viewed as an important institution in society, that parental educational investment in boys should be larger than that in girls, and that politics is the sphere of men rather than women. In addition, we believe that conservative women are most likely to reject abortion (as this constitutes a rejection of the role of motherhood) and to be against divorce (as divorce is regarded as threat to the institution 'family'). In addition, also suicide should not be justifiable, rejecting the divine gift of life and therefore constituting a 'sin' in all monotheistic religions. Table 7 shows how globalization impacts conservative secular values of women in MENA countries. Economic integration has a decisive impact on the erosion of conservative values that relate directly to female labor market participation (columns 1 and 2): with increased economic globalization, women in MENA countries have a higher probability to report that family is less important, and that boys should not be preferred when it comes to university education (and also that divorce can be justified, at the 10 percent level). While these two conservative values are considerably weakened by economic globalization, the remaining conservative attitudes appear to be fostered: women in MENA countries are more likely to believe that men form better political leaders, and that abortion and suicide are never justified.
Informational globalization appears to trigger some critical distance toward conservative values, particularly toward those not pertaining to labor market participation (divorce, abortion, suicide); in contrast, international personal contacts foster those conservative values (columns 3 through 6). Values pertaining to labor market participation are not affected at all by any type of worldwide information sharing (columns 1 and 2). Pseudo R2 0.074 0.036 0.034 0.036 0.046 0.047 Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Table 9 presents the more interesting case of women in Western Europe. As before, the results are presented for both the full sample from 1981 to 2014, and the two sub-samples pre-1995 and post-1995. Certain measures of political and social conservatism ('men make better political leaders', 'university education better for boys than for boys') were not recorded for a sufficient number of countries so that they had to be excluded from the analysis. The results for the full sample of Western Europe are reported in columns 1-4, while the results for the pre-1995 period are reported in columns 6-8 below, and those for the post-1995 period are reported in columns 9-
12.
Looking at Western Europe in its entire period 1981 through 2014, there is no impact of any facet of globalization on secular conservative values -this picture changes when we allow for the impact of globalization to differ between pre-1995 and post-1994 phases. It appears that during the cold war era values pertaining to the labor market were altered, while the remaining conservative values appear strongly affected after 1995. During the Cold War era, economic globalization but also international personal contacts decrease women's adherence to those conservative values that directly pertained to labor market participation (importance of family).
In the post-Cold War era instead, economic globalization negatively affects all other measures of conservatism (divorce, suicide, abortion) in this analysis. We can conclude that economic globalization influences, as a first step, women's view on her family, directly affecting her employment decisions, and then, decades later, the whole spectrum of conservative secular values that affect any decision. In general, the information flow through the internet appears equally destructive to female adherence to conservative secular values, while cross-national personal contacts appear to play little role. Pseudo R2 0.037 0.033 0.050 0.093 Note: All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Conservatism and female labor market participation
Religious values, religiosity and female employment
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we have investigated how globalization affects female conservatism -that is religious or secular conservatism. But do these values affect women's behavior, in particular their labor market participation? This section addresses this question. The WVS data provides also information on respondent's labor market status (besides age, gender, religion, the country of residence and survey year). The labor market status allows for the following categories: fully employed, half-time employed, self-employed, unemployed, but also housewife, disabled (other), student/apprentice, and retired. In the conventional definition of labor market participation, an 'active' person is defined as either 'employed' or 'officially recorded unemployed'. Many developing and transition countries as well as Southern European countries, however, do not have well-developed welfare state institutions of unemployment benefits that cover a long time period. Hence the group of persons actively seeking a job but reporting in any other group of employment status might have a significant share. For this reason, we use a definition of 'unemployed' including any other non-employment status such as 'unemployed', 'housewife', 'other' and 'early retired', excluding 'students'. As in the part on globalization and religious and conservative values, the analysis is restricted to women between the ages of 18 and 60. We apply regression model (1) accordingly; for computational ease estimations are carried out with Logit. Table 10 reveals that in the MENA countries women who adhere to religious values are less likely to be working, as expected (columns 1 through 4): The more women state that religion or god is important to them in their lives, the less likely they are reported as 'employed' in the survey. The same is observed for women who have stronger confidence in religious organizations. For self-report religious women, we observe the same tendency (significant at the 10 percent level). Table 10 'non-employed' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other) . All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A2 and A3 of the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Did the impact of religious values on female employment change over time? Only for Western Europe we can answer this question as the WVS surveys date back to 1981, while for the MENA countries and Eastern Europe survey data are available only from the mid-90s on. Table 11 compares Western Europe across two periods: the Cold War era 1981-1994 and the post-Cold War era 1995-2014. We observe that the employment-lowering impact of religious values on women in Western Europe has been stable over the last 30 years. ' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other) . All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations. All models include population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of religious values and religiosity are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings (see Table A3 of the Appendix). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Membership in religious organizations and female employment
We have already discussed that personal adherence to religious values and formal membership in religious organizations might be the two distinct facets of 'religiosity' -a difference that might then manifest in differing impacts on labor market behavior. Indeed, looking at female employment in the MENA region and Europe, Table 12 reveals that official membership in religious groups does not decisively affect women's employment, nor does attendance of service.
Only those women in Europe who attend service once a week or more (or who are self-report active in Eastern Europe) appear to be also religious persons in the sense of adhering to certain traditional values. ' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other) . All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, in Europe also of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Reference categories are: non-members in religious groups, attendance of service: (1) never. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
In general, membership in a relious group and active engagement in its group activities does not appear to impact employment of women in the same way as was observable for self-reported adherence to certain religious principles and values (Tables 10 and 11 ). This difference in labor market behavior between membership and religious values is apparent for the MENA region and Europe equally.
Conservative social and political values and employment of women
Whether or not adherence to conservative secular values has the expected (negative) impact on female employment in the regions under analysis is investigated in Table 13 . To approximate a conservative attitude, the same set of variables is used as in the first part of the empirical analysis on globalization (Tables 7 through 9): the importance of family, the question of university education for girls, the view on men as better political leaders, and the questions concerning the justifiability of divorce, suicide, and abortion. Table 13 reveals that, in general, women who adhere to these secular conservative values and attitudes are less likely to be in gainful employment: women who state that university education is more for boys than for girls, women who state that men are better political leaders, and women who think that divorce or abortion are never justified are less likely to be in a paid position. This general observation holds true for the MENA region and Eastern and Western Europe likewise.
We also observe in both regions that the importance of family works as a somewhat weaker restriction to female labor market participation (significances at the 10 percent levels), and the justifiability of suicide in case of the MENA countries. Overall, our prediction that conservative secular values impose a restriction on female labor market participation is fully confirmed. , 1981-1994 and 1995-2014 ' (unemployed, housewife, retired, other) . All models include age (age, age squared, age cubic), dichotomous indices of Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox denominations, population size (log-form), time fixed effects, and country fixed effects. The categorical measures of conservative values are treated as continuous in the regression; treating them as categorical does not qualitatively alter the findings. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. +, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The importance of gainful 'work' for human happiness and individual's self-esteem has undergone a profound societal change: until the 19 th century having to work for one's living was considered a bare necessity for survival; the nobility, wealthy people and 'honorable' women of the higher classes spent their time on leisure time activities and politics only. Goldin (2006) reports for 1920ies and 1930ies in the USA that even then working women were considered a poor-class phenomenon where husbands' wage was not sufficiently high to sustain their families; also in Western Europe until the 1960ies it was common for women to terminate their work contracts the day the got married and started a family. This gendered division of labor in society was supported by the traditional role model that, as social norm, attributes to women household and care work and to men the role of sole breadwinner.
Today, in most developed and many developing countries, having gainful 'work' has become an important determinant of experienced utility, identity and self-esteem for both men and women alike (Bjørnskov, Dreher & Fischer, 2007) . Sen (1999) argues that we view now income not only as a resource for consumption but also as means to social and political participation. This implies for women that earning their own income independently from men's allows them to participate in society as full members with equal rights. However, despite considerable improvements over time, labor markets continue to be characterized by gender disparity: specifically, sexually segregated jobs, large earning differentials between men and women, and a double-burden for women of both household work and gainful work (Elson & Cagatay, 2000) -all indicating the persistence of the traditional role model. However, gender roles assigned to men and women are socially constructed and contingent on cultural norms and, possibly, depend on the level of economic development and openness of the national economy (Fernandez, 2013) . It is only recently that ordinary people started to question and revise these traditional-conservative attitudes. Major policy implications of this study are that labor force participation of women can be promoted through both economic globalization and through increased access to internet and global media. First, through increased international integration of the country into global markets, economic globalization appears to change women's attitude toward the desirability of becoming employed; second, through increased access to global media and internet, informational globalization appears to weaken adherence to the traditional role model and conservative-secular and religious values.
KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Globalization: increased economic, political, social and cultural integration of countries into the world Female labor force participation: female population share that is employed or actively seeking a job.
Identity: person's sense of self
Religiosity: adherence to religious values and belief systems
Conservative values: adherence to the traditional role model which assigns to men the role of breadwinner and to women the role of household workers and childcare givers (2) -0.276 (0.64) God is important in life: (3) 0.062 (0.25) God is important in life: (4) 0.381 (1.09) God is important in life: (5) -0.076 (0.26) God is important in life: (6) -0.047 (0.21) God is important in life: (7) - 
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